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SOVEREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN THE
NAME OF PRESERVATION: A CONTRADICTION
IN TERMS AND OF THE CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
While metal detecting in his back yard in Demopolis, Alabama,
Eric Sherman found a gold watch from the Civil War era.' Excited
about the find, Eric showed the gold watch to some of his friends and
neighbors. A week later, the police knocked on his door, arrested Eric
and confiscated the watch. Eric had violated an Alabama statute that
grants the state ownership over any items of historical significance
found embedded in the ground.
2
This Note examines section 41-3-1 of Alabama's Antiquity Act
("AAA"), 3 which bestows ownership rights to the state over objects
found on private property.4 This Note departs from the present trend
in archaeological preservation law commentary5 and argues that, al-
I. Although this is a fictitious hypothetical, the Alabama Antiquity Act ("AAA")
was enforced in In Re Southern Natural Gas Co., 85 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep.
(CCH) P 61, 135, 1998 W.L. 758062 at *53-4. See infra text accompanying notes 179-84.
2. ALA. CODE § 41-3-1 (2000). The statute reads in part, "The state of Alabama
reserves to itself the exclusive right and privilege of exploring, excavating or survey-
ing... all aboriginal mounds and other antiquities, earthwork, ancient or historical forts
and burial sites within the State of Alabama, subject to the rights of the owner of the
land upon which such antiquities are situated, for agricultural, domestic or industrial
purposes, and the ownership of the state is herby expressly declared in any and all
objects whatsoever which may be found or located therein." Id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Pamela G. Levinson, Will the Circle be Unbroken? The Miami Circle Discov-
ery and its Significance for Urban Evolution and Protection of Indigenous Culture, 13 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 283, 331, 339-40 (2000) (cites the Alabama's Antiquity Act as a solution
to preservation and calls for "bold legislation" in the preservation context); Christopher
A. Amato, Digging Sacred Ground: Burial Site Disturbance and the Loss of New York's Native
American Heritage, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (advocating for the passage of New York's
Unmarked Burial Site Protection Act); Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Resti-
tution of Cultural Objects, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197, 198 (2001) (discussing a public inter-
ests in the restitution of looted artifacts); Patty Gerstenblith, Protection of Cultural
Heritage Found on Private Land: The Paradigm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings
After Lucas, 13 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 65, 111 (2000) (Advocating a model ordinance based
on the public's opinion of preservation); Pamela D'Innocenzo, Comment, "Not in My
Backyard" Protecting Archaeological Sites on Private Lands, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 131, 154
(1997) (advocating Alabama's Antiquity Act as the best means for archaeological pres-
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though Alabama has an interest in preserving items of antiquity and
discouraging looting, section 41-3-1 of the AAA violates the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 Al-
ternatively, this Note argues that the AAA violates the Due Process
Clause as being vague and overbroad. Part II of this Note introduces
the concerned interests involved in artifact looting and the controversy
that ignites whenever the Nation's "cultural resources" are
threatened. 7 In light of this controversy, the section also discusses the
history of common law and Constitutional law concerning property
rights over objects found in the ground.8 Part III examines the AAA in
a rational and constitutional context and shows how the statute affects
a taking of private property and fails to affect its purpose of preserving
antiquities. 9 Part IV argues there are already adequate protections in
place to discourage looting and proposes alternatives to unduly bur-
densome antiquity statutes such as the AAA. 1° Part V concludes that
Alabama's interest in historic preservation fails to justify unconstitu-
tional ownership statutes that deprive landowners and people engaged
in the hobby of metal detecting of the right to keep what they find on
private property. 1 This Note demonstrates that legitimate preserva-
tion interests concerning objects of antiquity can coincide with tradi-
tional notions of property ownership in the United States.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
ARCHAEOLOGICAL ARENA.
To understand the competing interests engaged in the preserva-
tion controversy, this section surveys these interests in light of present
common law and Constitutional doctrine. Because preservation con-
troversies generally surround specific incidents which take place
ervation); Michael J. Bushbaum, Comment, Beyond ARPA: Filling the Gaps in Federal and
State Cultural Resource Protection Laws, 23 ENVTL.L. 1353, 1367 (recognizes potential con-
stitutional problems but proposes county ownership of antiquities) But see Gene A.
Marsh, Walking the Spirit Trail: Repatriation and Protection of Native American Remains and
Sacred Cultural Items, 24 Amz. ST. LJ. 79, 11-16, 132 (acknowledging that across the
board reservation of state ownership in artifacts is ineffective).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also RICHARD B. CUNNINGHAM, ARCHAEOLOGY, RELICS
AND THE LAw, 208 (1999) (posing the question of whether the statute would constitute a
taking).
7. See infta Part II.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infta Part V.
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throughout the country, this section describes two major recent events
that have revived the debate over objects of antiquity found on private
property and triggered legislation.12 This section also briefly mentions
recreational metal detecting and how the interests of those engaged in
the hobby are not represented by the preservationists and commercial
artifact hunters who are in the forefront of the debate. 13 The focus of
this section then shifts to the common law and to Constitutional doc-
trines that govern found property. The common law is important be-
cause it promotes the development of important policies and foster
expectations about property ownership.1 4 Lastly, this section explores
the Constitutional doctrine of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment as it has been applied to the unique area of personal property.
15
States can enact laws, unlike the AAA, that demonstrate sensitivity to all
of the above considerations and still remain Constitutional, balanced
and practical.
16
A: Looting, Recreational Metal Detecting, and Archaeological Preservation.
Competing interests and notable controversies have heightened
awareness of the problem of looting of archaeological treasures and
have prompted calls for stricter regulations and enforcement of arche-
ological preservation laws. On one side of the debate are looters and
grave robbers who trespass on private property and desecrate graves in
order to sell the items on the black market.17 On the other side are
preservationists who look to Federal and state governments to preserve
items of archaeological significance. Non-participants with a stake in
the preservation controversy are those who engage in the hobby of
metal detecting and artifact hunting. These people neither cause any
significant property damage nor pose a threat to scientific or cultural
resources.18 At stake for the hobbyists is the existence of a popular
pastime that educates the public about the past and returns lost objects
12. See infta Part II(A).
13. See infra Part 11(A) (ii).
14. See infra Part II(B).
15. See infra Part II(C).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 243-47.
18. See Dep't of Natural Res. v. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1001 (Ind.
1989).
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to circulation. 19 The expectations of private landowners who allow in-
dividuals to metal detect on their land are also implicated in the de-
bate. Perhaps a reason that these interests are often overlooked may be
because of the emotional nature of these disputes over culturally and
historically significant objects.
20
For almost two thousand years, societies have been struggling with
the problems of looting and grave robbing.2 1 In fact, the first laws
against looting date back to Ancient Rome. 22 Over time, countries
have developed different approaches to preservation. For instance, in
England the concept of sovereign ownership applies to gold and silver
found in the ground.23 Similarly, other countries have vested owner-
ship of antiquities in the national government.2 4 In the United States,
the Antiquities Act of 190625 and Archaeological Resources Protection
Act ("ARPA") 2 6 have the same effect on federally controlled lands.
2 7
To prosecute looters on federally controlled lands, ARPA relies on
state trespass and looting laws.2 8 Unfortunately, trespass and looting
laws in the United States are often only enforced in relation to the
amount of public awareness of the issue.
29
19. See, eg., William R. Paxton, The Fighting Irish of Altadena?, EASTERN AND WEST-
ERN TREASURES, Oct. 2001, at 34 (Describing the return of a lost ring found in a park to
the true owner).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 250-55.
21. See RPcHARD B. CUNNINGHAM, ARCHAEOLOGY, RELICS, AND THE LAW 15
(1999) [hereinafter ARCHAEOLOGY].
22. Id.
23. See Leanna Izuel, Comment, Property Owners' Constructive Possession of Treasure
Trove: Rethinking the Finders Keepers Rule, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1659, 1666, n.48 (1991).
24. See Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16
CONN.J. INT'L L. 197, 211, n.56 (2001) (noting that Italy and Turkey have had such laws
since 1906).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433m (1994).
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1994).
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also United States v. Gerber 999 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1993).
29. See R.W. "Doc" GRIMM, TREASURE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (1993) citing
Steve Kinney, Relic Collector Agrees to Plead Guilty, THE EVANSVILLE PRESS, Apr. 17, 1992, at
1; For another incident not discussed in this note but which caused considerable schol-
arly debate about the legal implications of archaeological preservation see, Patty Ger-
stenblith, Fifth Annual Tribal Sovereignty Symposium: Protection of Cultural Heritage Found on
Private Land: The Paradigm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings After Lucas, 13 ST.
THomAS L. REv. 65, 111 (2000).
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i: The Problem of Looting
The most notable looting incident that sparked great controversy
and calls for increased legislation was the "Slack Farm Incident," which
occurred in December of 1987 at a farm in western Kentucky.3M A
group of ten individuals, one with a business card stating "Have Shovel,
Will Travel" paid a landowner for rights to dig on the landowners' forty
acre farm.3' Upon investigation, state authorities discovered that the
digging operation disturbed more than 650 Native American burial
sites.32 Because the men were on private property with the landowner's
permission, the men were only charged with the misdemeanor crime
of "desecration of a venerable object.-13 That law was originally meant
to prevent the toppling of tombstones and the burning of crosses by
the Klu Klux Klan. 34 The repercussions from the Slack Farm Incident
prompted visceral responses from many groups. Scientists noted that
the desecration made it impossible to document and learn from the
excavated Native American remains.3 5 Native American organizations
were outraged to learn of yet another incident where their ancestral
remains were desecrated. 36 The Kentucky Legislature reacted and
made desecration of graves a felony.3 7 Interestingly, the publicity sur-
rounding the Slack Farm Incident escalated the search and trade of
Native American artifacts because the news reports exaggerated the
value of the items at the grave sites.
38
Another notable controversy concerned land owned by General
Electric known as the "GE Mound," and an artifact dealer, named Ar-
30. See ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 21, at 441-44 (citing Harvey Arden, Who Owns our
Past?, 175 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 1989, at 378-85).
31. See Suzan H. Harjo, Last Rites for Indian Dead; Treating Remains Like Artifacts is
Intolerable, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, part 2, at 8.
32. See ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 21, at 443.
33. See id. at 442.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 443.
36. See Tom Uhlenbrock, Artifact Collectors Confer with Indians, ST. Louis POST DIs-
PATCH, Mar. 6, 1989, at 18b; Harjo, supra note 31. These resentments are deep rooted,
Suzan Harjo describes a shocking incident which took place in the 1800's where the
U.S. Army conducted an "Indian Cranial Study" where the army after slaughtering
4,500 Cheyenne people decapitated their heads and shipped them to Washington D.C.
for study. Id.
37. See ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 21, at 443.
38. See Uhlenbrock, supra note 36.
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thur Gerber. 39 Gerber received a one year jail sentence for violating
the ARPA,40 after he trespassed onto the GE Mound and removed a
significant number of artifacts.41 A construction worker at the site who
also was an amateur relic hunter had notified Gerber of the presence
of the artifacts at the site and agreed to take Gerber to the site for
$6,000.42 Notably, before heavy excavation began, archaeologists had
surveyed the GE Mound and mistakenly determined that the site was
not a burial site.4 3 It was the amateur relic hunter that found the 2,000
year old burial mound. Indeed, the GE Mound is currently one of the
very largest Hopewell mounds ever constructed.44 Supporters of
Gerber argued that without amateur artifact collectors, the mound
would have been bulldozed and the entire mound would be lost.45 In a
sense, Gerber became a martyr for amateur artifact collectors and rec-
reational metal detector users. 46 Organizations such as the American
Numismatic Association, the Antique Tribal Arts Dealer Association,
the American Society for Amateur Archaeology and several metal de-
tector manufacturers expressed their dissatisfaction with Gerber's con-
viction. 47 However, the majority of legal commentators praised the
decision in Gerber as a step in the right direction to expand the scope
of archeological protection.
48
ii. The Hobby of Metal Detecting
The metal detecting hobby originated after the Second World
War when the U.S. Government sold surplus land mine detectors to
39. See Valerie Richardson, Collector Finds a Hill of Trouble by Dealing in Indian Arti-
facts, WASH. TIMES, May 13, 1995, at A12.
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4070aa-470mm (1994); United States v. Gerber 999 F.2d 1112
(7th Cir. 1993).
41. See Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112.
42. See ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 21, at 291 (citing Cheryl Munson et al., The GE
Mound: An ARPA Case Study, 60 AMERICAN ANTIQUITY 131 (1995)).
43. See id. at 288.
44. See id. at 293.
45. See Richardson, supra note 39.
46. See id.; GRiMM, supra note 29, at 75.
47. See Doug Sword, Artifact Collectors Hope High Court Overturns Private-Land Ruling,
DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 11, 1994, at 12A.
48. See Pamela D'Innocenzo, Comment, "Not in My Backyard"ProtectingArchaeologi-
cal Sites on Private Lands, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 131, 137 (1997); Stephanie Ann Ades,
Commment, The Archaeological Resources Preservation Act: A New Application in the Private
Property Context, 44 CATH. U.L. REv. 599 (1995).
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the general public. 49 Today, approximately 100,000 recreational metal
detectors are sold annually to people who are engaged in the hobby.
50
The vast majority of metal detecting hobbyists are called "coin
shooters" and search for coins, relics, and treasures below the
ground. 51 They target these articles within the nine to ten inch range
of their detectors. Hobbyists can be found in schoolyards, beaches,
playgrounds, public places,52 and private property with historical sig-
nificance. 53 Overall, it is estimated that two million people a year en-
gage in some form of treasure hunting.
5 4
As a political group, these hobbyists are relatively unorganized
and powerless. 5 5 The main organization, the Federation of Metal De-
tector and Archaeological Clubs ("FDMAC") is a national organization
comprised of 148 regional metal detecting clubs.5 6 FDMAC's total
membership of 4,000 members is a small representation of the total
two million individuals who engage in treasure hunting.5 7 The FDMAC
has a Code of Ethics that has been adopted by the regional clubs and a
major metal detector manufacturer. 58 Because of FDMAC's limited
funds, when FDMAC wishes to lobby for a cause or litigate a matter, it
49. Lynch Denis, A Brief Histoiy of Metal Detectors, at http://www.metal-detect.com/
dothost.doc (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
50. See Letter from Jack Lowry, Associate Director of Consumer Sales, Garrett
Metal Detecting, to Charles Walsh (Feb. 12, 2002) (on file with New York Law School
Law Review).
51. THE PROFILE, at www.minelab.com/detecting/profile.html (last visitedJan. 19,
2002); Other recreational uses include prospecting for gold, beach combing and under
water exploration. Id.
52. David G. Bercaw, Comment, Requiem for IndianaJones: Federal Law, Native Ameri-
cans, and Treasure Hunters, 30 TULSA L.J. 213, 225 (1994).
53. See Ed Fedory, Relic Hunter the Book 23-28 (White's Electronics, 1994).
54. See GRIMM, supra note 29, at 6.
55. See BERCAW, supra note 52, at 225.
56. See Overview of Federation of Metal Detectors and Archaeological Clubs, at http://
www.fdmac.com/FDMACPolicy/Overview.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2001); see also
Property Rights Congress of America, Inc., at http://www.freedom.org/prc (last visited
Jan. 19, 2002) (an organization devoted to opposition of uncompensated takings).
57. See Overview of Federation of Metal Detectors and Archaeological Clubs, supra
note 56.
58. See id.; GARRETT METAL DETECTORS, OWNER'S MANUAL ULTRA GTA 500, 56;
The code of ethics provides in part: I will respect private property and do no treasure
hunting without the owner's permission, I will not destroy property, buildings..., I will
not litter, I will leave gates as found, I will not contaminate wells, creeks or other water
supplies, I will fill all excavations.. ., I will appreciate the proper heritage of our natural
resources, wildlife and private property . I will never trespass .. , If live ammunition is
found, mark the site and inform authorities. Id.
2003]
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must solicit services from willing attorneys who will work pro bono. 5 9
Consequently, it is not surprising that the hobby of metal detecting
does not receive substantial consideration when legislation affecting
the rights of these hobbyists is drafted.
60
B. The Common Law Found Property Doctrines
There are numerous common law developments and policies con-
cerning finders of lost property embedded in the soil. At common law,
a finder's property rights have developed into a hodgepodge of com-
peting doctrines.
6'
Common law categorizes found property as either lost, mislaid,
abandoned, treasure trove, or embedded property. 62 This Note focuses
only on the treasure trove63 and embedded property6 4 distinctions be-
cause they are most applicable to people who remove objects from the
soil and thus are superceded by the AAA.
65
Treasure trove refers to monetary items, such as gold or silver
coins, money and bullion that an owner has concealed in a private
place. 66 An additional treasure trove requirement that courts some-
times impose is the "appearance of antiquity."67 This ensures that the
true owner will not return for the property because the true owner is
most likely deceased. 68 If the property is treasure trove, the general
rule, around the turn of the Twentieth Century, was that "[i]n the ab-
sence of legislation upon the subject, the title to treasure trove belongs
59. Betty Weeks, Club News and Views, EASTERN AND WESTERN TREASURES, Oct.
2001, at 69.
60. See BERCAW, supra note 52, at 225.
61. See IZUEL, supra note 23, at 1681-86.
62. See RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §3.2 (3rd ed. Calla-
ghan & Co. 1955).
63. In England, the treasure trove doctrine awarded goods to the crown. Id. In the
United States, the doctrine was modified to reward the finder of the lost treasure. See
IZUEL, supra note 23, at 1667; eg: Campbell v. Col. Cochran, 416 A.D.2d 211, 222 n.10
(Del. 1980).
64. Constructive possession includes the embedded property category. See BROWN,
supra note62, at § 3.2.
65. See id. at § 3.1-2. Different rules emerged depending on whether the finder
was a trespasser, Barker v. Bates, 23 Am. Dec. 678 (Mass. 1832) (found property
awarded to landowner), licensee, Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264 (1908); or whether the
property was lost, mislaid or abandoned. See generally BARLOW BURKE, PERSONAL PROP-
ERTrY, 103 (1983).
66. See BURKE, supra note 65, at 103.
67. See I Am. JUR.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property § 4 (1962).
68. See id.
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to the finder as against all the world except the true owner. '6 9 The
place where the finder discovered the treasure trove is immaterial.
70
In fashioning the treasure trove doctrine, courts have put forth
two important policy concerns to explain the rule. First, courts recog-
nize that 'but for' the finder, the goods would have remained hidden
from the rest of the world and outside of circulation. 71 Second, the
"appearance of antiquity" requirement ensures that the true owner will
not return to reclaim the property because he or she is presumably
deceased. 72 Although these justifications appear legitimate, some com-
mentators suggest that courts are actually subscribing to emotion in-
stead of logic and therefore do not apply the doctrine consistently.
73
For instance, in an action to recover thirty seven pounds of gold, the
Georgia Court of Appeals in Groover v. Tippins74 described the glamour
of finding lost treasure by quoting Robert Louis Stevenson and con-
ceded that "the search for [Black Beard and Captain Kidd's] treasure
will continue to thrill millions yet unborn."75 Indeed, it is easy to imag-
ine that courts are sometimes swayed by the unusual circumstances
that accompany the recovery of treasure trove. 76 As Richard Cunning-
ham, a noted commentator on archeology law, stated "[t]he old rule of
treasure trove may make good theater, but it's poor law, and its death
can come none too soon."
77
Consequently, the modern trend among courts has been to aban-
don the treasure trove doctrine and adopt alternative theories.
78
69. Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264 (1908) (Court awarded buried coins to employ-
ees of landowner who were excavating and discovered gold coins buried by supposed
former owner of property). For cases supporting this proposition, see Davidson v. Strick-
land, 243 S.E.2d 705, 708(Ga. Ct. App. 1978); Grover v. Tippins, 179 S.E. 624, 635 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1935). This also applies to found property. See Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng.
Rep. 664 (1722)(the leading case on the "finder's keepers" rule).
70. See Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664.
71. See Grover, 179 S.E. at 634 (1935); BURKE, supra note 65, at 104.
72. See IZUEL, supra note 23, at 1675.
73. See id.
74. 179 S.E. 634 (Ga. App. 1935).
75. Id. at 635.
76. See IZUEL, supra note 23, at 1675.
77. Richard B. Cunningham, The Slow Death of the Treasure Trove (Feb. 7 2000), at
http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/trove/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
78. See Corliss v. Wenner, 34 P.3d 1100, 1105-6 (App. Ida. 2001) (court refused to
recognize treasure trove doctrine); Danielson v. Roberts, 74 P. 913, 914 (Or. 1904)
(considers law of treasure trove to have merged with the law governing lost goods);
Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1151, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1985) (treasure from a sunken ship identified as embedded property); Ritz v. Selma
2003]
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Courts that reject the treasure trove doctrine grant possession to the
landowners through the embedded property doctrine, also known as
constructive possession. 79 The constructive possession doctrine's goals
are to protect landowners' ownership expectations of items embedded
in the land8 ° and to discourage trespassers from entering the land.8 '
Another purpose of constructive possession is to maximize the true
owners' chances of reclaiming their property.8 2 The constructive pos-
session doctrine has been adopted by an increasing number of courts,
most recently in Corliss v. Wenner.8 3 In Corliss, the Idaho Court of Ap-
peals rejected the treasure trove doctrine and awarded title to a glass
jar of gold coins that was found by construction workers to the land-
owners. 8 4 The court rejected the treasure trove doctrine because the
court thought that the doctrine would encourage people to trespass on
private property in search for treasure.8 5 Instead, the court recognized
that present-day land ownership includes things above and below the
ground and that constructive possession comports to this developed
expectation.
86
Whether courts seek to reward either the finder for his diligence
in unearthing the object, or the landowner for his comprehensive own-
ership expectations, no state has adopted the English rule that items
found in the ground belong to the state or the sovereign. 87 Accord-
ingly, any state or federal law awarding title to found property to a state
contravenes deeply rooted common law policies behind the treasure
trove and constructive possession doctrines, and frustrates expecta-
United Methodist Church, 467 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa 1991) (coins found buried in
cans and jars under a garage floor was classified as mislaid); Morgan v. Wiser, 711
S.W.2d 220. 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (buried coins were classified as embedded prop-
erty); see generally BROWN, supra note 62.
79. See BROWN, supra note 62; The constructive possession doctrine originates
from England and states "[t]he possession of land carries with it in general, by our law,
possession of everything which is attached to or under our land... And it makes no
difference that the possessor is not aware of the things existence" South Staffordshire
Water Co. v. Sharam, 2 Q.B. 44 (1896) (internal citations omitted).
80. See IZUEL, supra note 23, at 1697; South Staffordshire Water Co., 2 Q.B. at 44.
81. See Corliss, 34 P.3d at 1106; BROWN, supra note 62, at § 3.5.
82. See BROWN, supra note 62, at § 3.5 (stating that the finder sometimes acts as a
bailee for the true owner).
83. 34 P.3d 1100 (Ida. App. 2001)
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1106.
86. Id. at 1106-08.
87. Cambpell v. Col. Cochran, 416 A.D.2d 211, 222 n.10 (Del Super. Ct. 1980).
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tions consistent with such policies that have developed over several
centuries.
C: The Constitutional Development of Property Rights
This section discusses the development of the United States Su-
preme Court's doctrine under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.88 This section then focuses on
the Court's struggle to apply the takings clause doctrine to personal
property.
In order to trace and gain an understanding about the "crazy quilt
pattern of the Supreme Court's doctrine" 89 regarding takings, it is im-
portant to mention the values that were placed on property rights to
limit legislative power.90 Initially, property rights acted as a limit to the
scope of government action.91 The highpoint of property protection
and freedom of contract occurred in Lochner v. New York, 9 2 where the
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to strike
down a minimum wage requirement.9 3 This protection of economic
liberties ended in the late 1930s and the court has since abandoned
the due process clause as a means of interference with property
rights. 9 4 The Court now relies on the Fifth Amendment'sJust Compen-
sation Clause.
95
Although uncompensated takings regularly took place before
1776,96 the Constitution's framers recognized the importance of insti-
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.10, at 469
(6th ed. 2000) (quoting Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP.CT.REv. 63 (1962)).
90. JENNIFER NEDELESKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERIcAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM, 223-29 (1990).
91. Id.
92. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
93. Id. While Lochner has been criticized for its lack of judicial deference to the
legislature, constitutional scholar Cass R. Sunstein argues that Lochner can also be un-
derstood as to "refer to preservation of the existing distribution of wealth and entitle-
ments under the baseline common law. Thus understood, Lochner has been hardly
overruled." Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 875 (1987).
94. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). This case is convention-
ally known as the turning point. See NEDELSKY, supra note 90, at 226.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922); Penn Central Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
96. See William M. Treanor, The Origin and Original Significance of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 699-97 (1985).
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tuting a limit on the government's power over individuals.9 7 In re-
sponse to this concern, James Madison drafted the Fifth Amendment's
Compensation Clause.9 8 The Compensation Clause provides that "No
person shall be.. .deprived of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law;.. .nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."9 9
Notwithstanding the textual suggestion of a "public use" require-
ment, the Supreme Court has held that the takings clause does not
prohibit the government from taking private property. Instead, the
Compensation Clause places conditions on the government's exercise
of that power.10 0 Over time, the Court has interpreted the public use
requirement to mean virtually any use.'0 1 For example, in Berman v.
Parker,'0 2 the Court held that even a redistribution of property to a
private entity satisfies the public use requirement.
10 3
Although the Supreme Court generally refuses to interfere with
state action based on a broad interpretation of public use,' 0 4 the Court
does recognize a need for compensation when states affect individuals'
property rights. 10 5 Today, the Court struggles with what government
actions constitute compensable takings.' 0 6
In answering modern takings issues, the Court has developed an
ad hoc and per se approach to define what constitutes a compensable
taking.' 0 7 The ad hoc approach first developed because of burden-
some regulations.'0 8 The Court also occasionally applies the ad hoc
97. See id. Before 1776, uncompensated takings regularly took place by the colo-
nies with respect to real property in order to promote economic growth. While few felt
that the federal government would have the occasion to take property, Madison saw the
protection of property as critical. Id.
98. See NEDELESKY, supra note 90, at 17-22.
99. U.S. CoNsTr. amend. V.
100. See First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Monongahela Navigation CO. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312, 313 (1893).
101. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1984);
102. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
103. Id.
104. See NOWAK, supra note 89, § 11.13, at 498.
105. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
106. See NOWAK supra note 89, at §11.12.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 110-29.
108. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Penn Central v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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approach to personal property.'109 The ad hoc approach was first used
in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. 10 Justice Holmes recognized that the
extent of a property's diminution in value was "a question of degree"
and could not be disposed of by per se propositions.' Penn Central v.
City of New York,' 1 2 refined this analysis. Penn Central involved the own-
ers of Grand Central Station who were unable to obtain approval to
build a skyscraper above the station.1 13 The Court announced three
considerations to be used in the ad hoc analysis.1 14 These considera-
tions are: (1) the impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations; and (3)
the character of the government action. 115 The Court held that the
denial of a permit to build a skyscraper above the station was not a
taking because the city had only denied the owners' right to use the
above airspace, the denial was not discriminatory, and the owners
could still realize a return on their investment.
1 16
The Court adopted a similar approach to Penn Central, when deal-
ing with federal regulations concerning personal property of historical
significance." 17 In Andrus v. Allard,'1 8 the Court did not find a com-
pensable taking where federal statutes and regulations" 9 banned the
sale and interstate transportation of artifacts containing certain bird
feathers. 120 The Court held that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 1 2 1 and
109. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); see also Washington Legal Found. v.
Legal Found. of Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 857 (9th Cir. 2001)(applied an ad hoc anal-
ysis to determine whether there was a taking of interest in a bank account); but see
Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 270 F.3d 180, 186
(5th Cir. 2001) (applied per se analysis to determine whether there was a taking of inter-
est in a bank account).
110. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn.v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
111. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 115-18.
112. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
113. See id. at 115-18.
114. See id. at 124.
115. See id.; see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (Court applied ad hoc
analysis to government statute which interfered with rights to pass on property to one's
heirs).
116. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128-38.
117. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
118. Id.
119. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1978); Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 668 (a); 50 C.F.R. § 21.2(a), 22.2(a)(1978).
120. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 54.
121. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1978).
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Eagle Protection Act' 22 did not amount to a taking because the statutes
did not compel the surrender of the items to the government and
there was no invasion or restraint by the government on the items.
12 3
For instance, the Court hypothesized that the person affected by the
statutes could still be able to "exhibit the artifacts for an admissions
charge."1 2 4 Like Penn Central, the Court held that a taking had not
occurred because it was unclear that the appellees would be unable to
derive some economic benefit from the artifacts.
125
In addition to the ad hoc analysis, the Supreme Court has put
forth two per se rules regarding what constitutes a taking. First, the
Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,]26 held that a compen-
sable taking occurs when a real property owner is called to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses of the propery. 12 7 Second, in Loretto v. Tel-
eprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. ,128 the Court held that any permanent
physical occupation of private property constituted a taking.
129
Not surprisingly, the existence of different tests to determine what
constitutes a taking creates confusion. Presently, there is a circuit split
concerning what analysis to apply to earned interest in a bank ac-
count.1 30 While the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the issue
of whether or not a per se or ad hoc analysis is appropriate for interest
money taken by the state, the Court has rejected the application of a
per se rule in the context of fungible goods such as money.1 3 ' The
Court's reasoning was that because money is neither personal nor real
property it is not subject to the per se rules. 13 2 Clearly, this reasoning is
inapplicable to unique items such as artifacts.
122. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1978).
123.. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 66.
126. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
127. Lucas, 505 U.S at 1003; See NowAK & ROTUDNA, supra note 89, §11.12 at 480.
128. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
129. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
130. See Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Washington, 271 F.3d 835
(9th Cir. 2001), cert granted, 122 S.Ct. 2355 (2002) (Applied ad-hoc inquiry to interest
earned in a bank account); Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access, 270 F.3d
180 (5th Cir. 2001) (Applies per-se inquiry to interest earned in bank account).
131. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989); Eastern Enter. v. Apfel,
524 U.S. 498 (1998) (requirement to pay millions in employee benefits was not a per se
taking).
132. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 62 n.9.
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In Nixon v. United States, '3 3 the D.C. Court of Appeals applied the
per se rule when determining whether the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act, 13 4 constituted a taking of former President
Nixon's presidential papers. In dicta, the Supreme Court has sup-
ported the D.C. Circuit's application of the per se rule.135 Nonetheless,
the Court has yet to apply a per se rule to personal property.
1 36
Because the Court's definition of what constitutes a taking has wa-
vered,1 37 there is confusion as to whether a per se or ad hoc approach
best applies to a statute that reserves ownership to the state of personal
property found in the ground. Because the AAA is a blanket declara-
tion of ownership of all artifacts owned below the ground and artifacts
are unique items, the better approach is to determine that the statute
applies as a per se taking. Nonetheless, as will be discussed in Part III,
both a per se and ad hoc analysis compel the same result.
D. The Deferential Trend in Scrutiny of Archaeological Protection Acts
The Alabama's Antiquity Act ("AAA") 1 38 has yet to be constitu-
tionally challenged. Nevertheless, less draconian statutes have with-
stood takings and due process challenges.' 3 9 Courts are sympathetic to
preservationists and one court has gone so far as to expand the scope
of an archaeological protection act to private property.1 4 0 State and
federal courts are siding with governments and archaeological
preservationists by allowing increased control over activities under-
taken by private landowners.'
4t
In Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council,14 2 the In-
diana Supreme Court held that a mining prohibition on a small area
of land did not amount to a taking.t 43 The Indiana State Department
133. 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
134. 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
135. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 62 n.9 (1989) (stating that money is not personal or
real property, thus not subject to the per se doctrine).
136. Id.
137. See NOWAK & ROTUDNA, supra note 89, at § 11.12.
138. ALA. CODE § 41-3-1 (Michie 2000).
139. See Dep't of Natural Res. v. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind.
1989); Hunziker v. Iowa, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994); Washington v. Lightle, 944 P.2d
1114 (Wash. App. 1997).
140. See Whitacre v. Indiana, 619 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. App. 1993) affirmed, 629 N.E.2d
1236 (1994).
141. See ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 21, at 349.
142. 542 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. 1989).
143. Idat 1001.
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of Natural Resources designated a portion of the mining site unsuita-
ble for surface coal mining because the site contained archeologically
significant material. 144 The court accepted the notion that the preser-
vation of national and state heritage was within the "broad range of
government interests."'1 45 The court reasoned that while the desig-
nated land could not be mined, the impact on the property was only a
six and a half percent loss of the total mining area. 146 Because the
mining company could still use the majority of its property the court
followed the Penn Central1 47 analysis and did not find the restriction to
constitute a taking.'
4 8
Similarly, developers in Hunziker v. State of Iowa, 14 9 suffered a sub-
stantial loss of value in their investment after the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that an archaeological preservation statute did not consti-
tute a taking.'5 0 Pursuant to a state statute, 151 the state archaeologist
prohibited any disruption of the developer's newly purchased lot be-
cause it contained a Native American burial mound. 152 The court held
that even though the human remains were not discovered until after
the developer bought the land, the statute gave the state archaeologist
the right to prevent any disturbance of the ground before the sale.1
5 3
This limitation on the land's use was present in the title before the
land was sold. 15 4 As a result of this action, the value of the property
instantly declined from its purchase price of $50,000 to $100.155 Four
years after the ruling, the lot was still owned by the developer and con-
tinued to decay.156 Attempts to dispose of the lot to neighboring land-
owners, neighborhood associations and governmental entities for
garden space or public access were all unsuccessful.' 57 The implication
of the Supreme Court of Iowa's decision is that landowners in Iowa
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1004.
146. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
148. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d at 1003.
149. 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994).
150. Id. at 371.
151. IOWA CODE § 305A.9 (1991).
152. Hunziker, 519.N.W.2d at 368.
153. Id. at 368-69.
154. Hunziker, 519 N.W.2d at 371.
155. Id. at 372 (SnellJ., dissenting).
156. See ARCHAEOLOGV, supra, note 21, at 520.
157. See id.
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take their land subject to the risk that there might be undiscovered
remains that might prevent any sale or feasible use of the property.'-
5 8
Aside from takings challenges, courts have addressed other Con-
stitutional issues present in archaeological protection statutes. ' 59 One
problem is the void for vagueness issue present in the definitions of
"archaeological resources",1 60 "antiquity", 16 1 or "object of antiq-
uity".16 2 In United States v. Diaz,163 the Ninth Circuit held that the use
of the words "ruin", "monument", and "object of antiquity" in the An-
tiquities Act of 1906164 was unconstitutionally vague. ' 65 The court rea-
soned that the Antiquities Act failed to articulate what objects were
protected by the Act. 166 However, in Washington v. Lightle,167 the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals addressed an attack on a Washington Stat-
ute168 that made it a crime to dig on private or public lands that were
deemed "archaeological resources".169 Because the Washington statute
had a comprehensive definition of what constituted an "archaeological
resource", the court determined that the statute as applied was not
vague because it defined the exact artifact that the defendants were
excavating.17 0 The court was not presented with the opportunity to ad-
dress whether the statute was facially unconstitutional.
171
In Indiana, the Court of Appeals of Indiana went so far as to ex-
tend a regulatory statute to apply to private property.' 72 In Whitacre v.
158. See Hunziker, 519 N.W.2d at 372(SnellJ., dissenting)("It is pernicious because
there is virtually no notice to a landowner of the State's inchoate claim and no opportu-
nity to review the government action or appeal to the courts"); This case may no longer
be good law as the United States Supreme Court recognized this danger and held that
"[f]uture generations too, have the right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the
use of land." Palazollo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
159. See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974); Washington v. Lightle,
994 P.2d 1114 (Wash. App. 1997).
160. See infra text accompnaying notes 242-43.
161. See ALA. CODE, § 41-3-1 (2000). "Antiquity" is not defined in the statute.
162. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
163. Id.
164. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (1988).
165. Diaz, 499 F.2d at 114.
166. Id.
167. 994 P.2d 1114 (Wash. App. 1997).
168. WASH. REv. CODE § 27.53.060 & 27.53.040 (1997).
169. Lightle, 994 P.2d at 1116.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Whitacre v. Indiana, 619 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. App. 1993), affd, 629 N.E.2d 1236
(1994).
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Indiana,1 73 a man and wife who were amateur archaeologists pur-
chased a piece of property to excavate and remove historical arti-
facts. 174 After the legislature passed the Indiana Historic Preservation
Act, 175 the parties sought a declaratory judgment to rule that the stat-
ute was inapplicable to privately owned property. 176 Although the Indi-
ana Preservation Act did not explicitly mention private property, the
Indiana Court of Appeals held that the Act required those disturbing
the ground on private or public property to obtain approval from the
Department of Natural Resources. 17 7 On appeal, the Indiana Supreme
Court affirmed the opinion, but remarked in a footnote that Whitacre
had waived his unconstitutional taking argument.
178
E. The Antiquity Act of Alabama
There has yet to be a court challenge to the Alabama's Antiquities
Act ("AAA"). However, in an administrative proceeding the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") documented the enforce-
ment of the statute. 179 During construction of the North Alabama
Pipeline Project, Southern Natural Gas Company ("Southern") exca-
vated a substantial portion of private property and removed an undis-
closed amount of artifacts.1 80 Southern was unable to return the
artifacts to the landowners because the AAA precluded return of the
artifacts to owners without Alabama's consent.1 8' In response, a group
of landowners complained to the FERC about Southern's removal of
artifacts from their property without consent and demanded the ob-
jects back.' 82 The Alabama Historical Commission refused to immedi-
ately return the objects. However, the Alabama Historical Commission
did note that "after curation and study" it might be willing to lend
some of the artifacts to the landowners. 83 The FERC sided with the
Alabama Historical Commission and directed the landowners to con-
173. 619 N.E.2d 605.
174. Whitacre, 619 N.E.2d at 606.
175. INn. CODE ANN. § 14-3-3.4 (2000).
176. Whitacre, 619 N.E.2d at 606.
177. Whitacre, 619 N.E.2d at 607.
178. 629 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1994).
179. In Re: Southern Natural Gas Co., 85 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) P




183. Id. at *53-54 (Internal quotations omitted).
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tact the Historical Commission to arrange for a loan agreement. 1 4 As
of date, the artifacts have not been returned to the landowners.
1 85
It is important to note that the AAA does not mention loan ar-
rangements to affected landowners. While the AAA allows Alabama to
excavate historically significant sites subject to the rights of some land-
owners, the AAA contains a blanket ownership statement of artifacts in
the land which supercedes the rights of the landowners. The AAA pro-
vides that:
"The State of Alabama reserves itself the exclusive right
and privilege of exploring, excavating or surveying,
through its authorized officers, agents or employees, all
aboriginal mounds and other antiquities, earthworks, an-
cient or historical forts and burial sites within the State of
Alabama, subject to the rights of the owner of the land
upon which antiquities are located, for agricultural, do-
mestic or industrial purposes, and the ownership of the
state is hereby expressly declared in any and all objects
whatsoever which may be found or located therein."
186
Violation of the AAA is also punishable as a misdemeanor.
18 7
Even though the current trend among state courts is to find simi-
lar preservation statutes Constitutional, the AAA is distinguishable
from other statutes as it reserves blanket ownership rights to Alabama.
Thus it is possible for a court to find the AAA unconstitutional. The
rest of this Note demonstrates that this result is both well founded and
desirable.
III: ANALYSIS OF THE ALABAMA STATUTE THAT RESERVES THE RIGHT
OF OWNERSHIP FOR THE STATE OF ALL PROPERTY FOUND
BELOW THE GROUND
The AAA is subject to Constitutional challenge under both the
due process and takings clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
184. In re Southern Natural Gas Co., 85 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at
134, 1998 W.L. at *54.
185. Telephone Interview with Myra Banks, Alabama Historical Commission (May
1, 2002).
186. ALA. CODE § 41-3-1 (2000).
187. See ALA. CODE § 41-3-6 (2000) The section is entitled "Criminal Penalties" and
states: "Any person who shall explore or excavate any of the aboriginal mounds, earth-
works or other antiquities of this state contrary to the laws of this state shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 for each
offense."
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ments of the United States Constitution. This part of the Note argues it
is unconstitutional on both grounds. First, this section argues the AAA
is distinguishable from the statute in Washington v. Lightle.188 Unlike
the statute in Washington,'8" the AAA fails to define any of its material
terms.1 9 0 Second, this section shows that although there may be a cog-
nizable state interest in protecting archaeological resources, 9 1 the
AAA affects a taking because it strips landowners of a traditional pri-
vate property right.
1 92
First, the AAA's language is ambiguous as to whether or not the
state reserves the right of ownership to "antiquities" only or to "any
and all objects whatsoever which may be found or located" in the
ground.' 93 Even assuming that the statute only applies to "antiquities,"
the AAA is unclear as to whether the watch that Eric found, from the
hypothetical in section 1,194 is an antiquity.
195
Antiquity has several common definitions. The two most relevant
definitions are that an antiquity is "an object from ancient times",1 96
and has "the quality of being old or ancient".' 97 Clearly a watch from
the civil war era could be something of considerable age, however,
does that same watch qualify as an antiquity if it was dropped in the
ground last night? Furthermore, does an object have to be something
of value before it becomes an antiquity? Like Diaz, where the court
invalidated the Antiquities Act of 1906 for not providing notice of what
188. 994 P.2d 1114 (Wash. App. 1997).
189. Id.
190. The statute reads: "The State of Alabama reserves itself the exclusive right and
privilege of exploring, excavating or surveying, through its authorized officers, agents
or employees, all aboriginal mounds and other antiquities, earthworks, ancient or histori-
cal forts and burial sites within the State of Alabama, subject to the rights of the owner
of the land upon which such antiquities are situated, for agricultural, domestic or in-
dustrial purposes, and the ownership of the state in any and all objects whatsoever which may be
found or located therein. ALA. CODE § 41-3-1 (2000).
191. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 n.20 (1979); Whitacre, 619 N.E.2d at 606.
192. See supra Part II(C); For another section of the Alabama Code which is facially
discriminatory and may violate the dormant commerce clause see ALA. CODE, § 41-3-2
(Michie 2000), which prohibits any non residents, or their agents from exploring or
excavating historical sights or taking them out of the state. Id.
193. Id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
195. See ALA. CODE § 41-3-1 to 41-3-6, 41-9-24 to 41-9249.1. Nowhere in the Code is
antiquity or antiquities defined.
196. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 60 (3d ed. Houghton Mifflin 1993).
197. Id.
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constituted an "artifact",' 9 8 the AAA fails Constitutional muster for the
same reason. Without clear definitions of what objects in the ground
constitute an "artifact", the Alabama Historical Commission in the
Southern case' 9 9 could have had the objects appraised, and then re-
turned all the objects with low value to the landowner and reserved the
valuable objects for the Commission.
The AAA is unlike the Washington Preservation Statute,2 0° which
has the term "archaeological resource" internally defined within the
statute.20 1 This internal definition made the Washington statute appli-
cable to the defendants in Washington v. Lightle, who were digging for
arrowheads. 20 2 In applying the same void for vagueness test that was
applied in Lightle, to the AAA, it is clear that the AAA allows for dis-
criminatory law enforcement by Alabama because the statute does not
define objective standards.
20 3
Furthermore, the AAA's language fails to recognize that there are
differences between looters who raid tombs to sell items on the black
market 20 4 and hobbyists with metal detectors. 20 5 The casual hobbyist
does not disturb the ground, nor does he necessarily have an interest
in selling found items. 20 6 While the federal ARPA statute recognizes
this difference between looters and an individual hunting for relics on
198. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
199. See In Re Southern Natural Gas Co., 85 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) P
61, 134, 1998 W.L. 758062 at *54.
200. WASH. REV. CODE § 27.53.040 (1997).
201. Id. "archaeological resource" is defined as "All sites, objects structures, arti-
facts, implements, and locations of prehistoric or archaeological interest, whether previ-
ously recorded or still unrecognized, including, but not limited to... implements of
culture such as projectile points, arrowheads... and other implements and artifacts of
any material... are hereby declared archaeological resources." Id.
202. Washington v. Lightle, 994 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Wash. App. 1997)
203. Id.
204. See Harvey Arden, Who Owns Our Past?, 175 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 1999,
at 378-85. Recounts the story of the "Slack Farm Ten" scandal where the alleged looters
desecrated approximately 650 burials. Excerpt obtained from ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note
21, at 272.
205. See FEDORY, supra note 53, at 132.
206. Id. at 132.
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his own property,20 7 the AAA reserves the right to state possession for
all antiquities in the ground before they are even discovered.
20 8
The AAA also fails to provide just compensation for the taking of
personal property. In Alabama Code § 41-9-249, the Alabama Histori-
cal Commission has the power to "acquire by exercise of eminent do-
main, historic structures of paramount or exceptional importance.
'20 9
The AAA contains no such compensation provision. 2 10 This is particu-
larly troubling in light of the events in Southern, where the Alabama
Historical Commission did not offer any type of compensation for the
taking of the artifacts, but instead offered to "loan" selected artifacts
back to the property owners.
21 1
Based on the intrusiveness and effect of the AAA, the choice to
apply either a per se or ad hoc approach to the AAA requires thatjust
compensation be provided within the statute. As a threshold matter,
Alabama would be justified in taking property pursuant to the "public
use" 2 1 2 requirement as stated in the Alabama Historical Commission's
Charter. 213 The Charter outlines the interest of preserving the State's
historical heritage.
21 4
Although the Commission's intention would probably qualify as a
"public use,"2 15 it is questionable whether the Alabama's action of re-
serving the right to ownership of personal property found in the
ground warrants a per se or ad hoc takings analysis. Claiming owner-
ship of items before they are excavated, deprives the future artifact
finder of the property's economic value. 2 16 Furthermore, the land
207. See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa (1988). ARPA defines "archaeological resource" as "any
material remains of past human life" or remains of activities which are more than 100
years old. ARPA specifically excludes arrowheads found on the surface, rocks, coins,
bullets or minerals which are not archaeologically significant. Id.
208. ALA. CODE § 41-3-1 (2000).
209. ALA, CODE § 41-9-249 (2000).
210. ALA. CODE § 41-3-1.
211. In Re Southern Natural Gas Co., 85 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) P 61,
134, 1998 W.L. 758062 at *54.
212. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1984).
213. ALA. CODE § 41-9-240 (2000).
214. ALA. CODE § 41-9-240 states: "[t]he historical heritage of the State of Alabama
is among its most valued and important assets, and the preservation of. historic sites,
building and objects within the state is of substantial concern to Alabama and its peo-
ple. It is of special value to the youth of Alabama as a constant reminder of the circum-
stances under which our state was born and nurtured and under which our great nation
has developed." Id.
215. See Hawaii, 475 U.S. at 239-48.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
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owner who purchased the property with the expectation of owning eve-
rything above and below the surface may find that not to be true if the
state chooses to exercise sovereign ownership over any excavated
items. This would be impermissible under a per se approach where
Alabama has deprived citizens of all beneficial economic use of their
property.
217
Whether Alabama's action of acquiring property qualifies as a tak-
ing under the ad hoc analysis depends on an interpretation of the Su-
preme Court case of Andrus.2 18 In Andrus, a decisive factor in the
Court not finding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act a taking was because
the statute did not compel the defendant to surrender artifacts. 21 9 The
AAA does compel a property owner to surrender personal property.
This is evidenced by the situation in Southern, where the landowners
were unable to get their artifacts. 220 Therefore, the AAA should be
found to be a compensable taking.
As a second matter, the Supreme Court would also have to decide
whether the Historical Commission's offer to loan certain artifacts
back to the landowners and granting temporary right to possession
saves the statute from constituting a taking.2 2 1 Nonetheless, the loan
offer still constitutes a taking because the AAA causes landowners to
lose bargaining power with respect to the artifacts and the ability to
dispose of them. The loss of bargaining power is like the situation in
Nixon v. United States2 22 where the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that simply giving Richard Nixon access to his presidential papers for
his own autobiographical and historical work did not relieve the gov-
ernment of its obligation to compensate the former president.
223
Thus, the mere offer to simply loan some of the artifacts back to the
landowners is insufficient to save the AAA from constituting a taking.
Without just compensation for the AAA's reservation of owner-
ship, the AAA undermines Alabama's preservationist purpose. Conse-
quently, the AAA discourages finders from removing artifacts from the
217. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coal Council, 505 U.S 1003; NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 89, §11.12 at 480.
218. 444 U.S. 51.
219. Id. at 65.
220. In Re Southern Natural Gas Co., 85 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) P61,
134, 1998 W.L. 758062 at *54.
221. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65.
222. 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
223. Id. at 1285.
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soil. 2 2 4 This discouragement risks the loss of significant cultural re-
sources that will remain unearthed. The AAA is a prime example of
how excessive abrogation of individual property rights "invites private
conduct that will negate its intended consequences.
22 5
The AAA also conflicts with common law rationales and tradi-
tions. 2 2 6 The AAA destroys economic and practical motivations to
search for and unearth any undiscovered artifacts. 227 Moreover, the
AAA is inconsistent with Alabama's lost property statute.228 Under
§ 32-12-4 of the statute, the finder may take care of a lost object and
obtain compensation for expenses related to holding the item. 229 Sub-
sequently, the finder is entitled to sell the item if the owner cannot be
found with reasonable diligence. 230 Thus, the finder of a watch embed-
ded in his property has a motivation to be untruthful and simply claim
that he found the item above the ground or purchased it a yard sale in
order to avoid being subject to the AAA. This encouragement of dis-
honesty is consistent with Richard Epstein's view that "[e]ach form of
[excessive] regulation invites private conduct which will negate its in-
tended consequences." 23 1 As demonstrated above, the AAA actually
endangers the artifacts that the AAA was designed to protect. Accord-
ingly, states such as Alabama should reconsider the concept of sover-
eign ownership of private property found below the ground, and
recognize the safeguards already in place.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Presently, even without the AAA, there are adequate safeguards
that protect the public interest of preserving archaeological re-
sources. 23 2 Indeed, the Federal Government's ownership of the major-
224. For an argument against this position and advocating for regulations which
deprive a finder and landowner rights to found property see, Patty Gerstenblith, Fifth
Annual Tribal Sovereignty Symposium: Protection of Cultural Heritage Found on Land; Para-
digm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings Doctrine After Lucas, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
65 (2000).
225. Richard A. Epstein, Introduction of RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND
THE LAw, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, at xiii (2000).
226. See supra Part 1(B).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
228. ALA. CODE § 35-12-5 (2000).
229. ALA. CODE § 35-12-1 to 3.
230. ALA. CODE § 35-12-5.
231. See Epstein, supra note 231225, at xiii.
232. See supra Part II(A).
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ity of archaeologically significant land 23 3 and conventional state
criminal statutes2 3 4 are sufficient to prevent looting. Even if states are
compelled to regulate private property rights, a model uniform statute
has been suggested.2 35 These solutions serve the state interests of pro-
tecting the majority of archaeological resources and simultaneously
protecting individuals and their traditional expectations of property
ownership.
2 36
State intrusion onto private property rights is unnecessary as the
Federal Government and states own over thirty nine percent of the
land in the United States. 237 This is particularly compelling since the
land the Federal Government manages is primarily in the Western part
of the country where a large proportion of archaeological resources
are found. 238 Accordingly, sovereign ownership of antiquities on land
owned by the sovereign is effective in preserving our cultural past and
makes sense in light of the common law tradition of property
ownership.
In the Federal realm, there are pervasive regulations in place to
protect archaeological resources. 23 9 Some of those protections include
the Native American Graves Repatriation Act,2 4 0 the National Historic
Preservation Act, 2 41 and ARPA.2 42 ARPA's scope is particularly broad
as it not only prohibits excavation of "any material remains of past
233. See Patty Gerstenblith, Fifth Annual Tribal Sovereignty Symposium: Protection of
Cultural Heritage Found on Private Land: The Paradigm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory
Takings Doctrine After Lucas, 13 ST. THoMAS L. REV. 65, 78-79 (2000) citing: U.S. General
Accounting Office, Cultural Resources: Problems Protecting and Preserving Federal Archaeologi-
cal Resources (1987); Federal Lands: Information on Land Owned and on Acreage with Conser-
vation Restrictions (1995).
234. See A.A. CODE §§ 13A-7-2 to 13A-7-4 (2000).
235. See Fifth Annual Tribal Sovereignty Symposium, supra note 233, at 106-08 (advocat-
ing Model Statute based on public opinion). While this would provide better notice and
uniform enforcement, this Note would reject a proposal that follows public opinion
when infringing on an individual's property rights.
236. See infra text accompanying notes 248-55.
237. National Wilderness Institute, State by State Government Land Ownership (1995),
at http://www.nwi.org/Maps/LandChart.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002).
238. See Fifth Annual Tribal Sovereignty Symposium, supra note 233, at 78-79 (citing:
U.S. General Accounting Office, Cultural Resources: Problems Protecting and Preserving Fed-
eral Archaeological Resources (1987)); Federal Lands: Information on Land Owned and on Acre-
age with Conservation Restrictions (1995).
239. See infra notes 240-42.
240. 25 U.S.C. §§ 30001-13 (1992).
241. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3002(c) (2) (1992).
242. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4070aa-470mm (1940).
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human life which are of material interest" on federal lands, but it also
prohibits the interstate trafficking of such artifacts regardless of
whether they were found on private or public land.243 The Court of
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gerber,244 held that the
defendant could be prosecuted under ARPA because the defendant
had trespassed on private property and removed artifacts and there-
fore violated a state law whose purpose was to deter such behavior.
24 5
Clearly, with protections already in place it is unnecessary to overly
burden private property with costly restrictions.
As previously illustrated, trespassing and conversion laws in con-
junction with ARPA deter and punish looters and grave robbers who
enter private property without the owner's permission. 246 As a result of
ARPA, hobbyists, such as those who use metal detectors to unearth
small artifacts, find it in their own best interest to obtain permission of
the landowners before exploring the land.
247
Lastly, state legislators could adopt a Uniform Model Code248 that
either ensures just compensation for artifacts of cultural significance
or imposes permit requirements on state owned or controlled land.
249
Alternatively, Georgia's permit requirement provides protection to cul-
turally significant artifacts on state lands.2 50 Georgia requires anyone
who wishes to metal detect or conduct archaeological research on state
land to obtain a permit from the state archaeologist. 251 In addition, all
items of archaeological significance found on state land are property
243. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
since defendant had trespassed on private property and stolen the artifacts and was thus
in violation of state law, he could be prosecuted under ARPA).
244. Id. at 1112.
245. Id. at 1116.
246. See id.
247. See FEDORY, supra note 205, at 29.
248. See Fifth Annual Tribal Sovereignty Symposium, supra note 233, at 10609.
249. See GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-52(c) (2001). The statute also "urges" individuals
metal detecting on private land to comply with the permit requirement. However, the
Georgia Council of Professional Archaeologists misreads the statute and promulgates
that you must notify the Georgia Department of Natural Resources if you wish to look
for artifacts on private land. This is not true. Georgia Council of Professional Archaeol-
ogists, Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 20, 2000), at http://www.georgia-archaeol-
ogy.org/gcpa/faq.html (last visited May 13, 2002).
250. See GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-52(c) (2001).
251. Id.
[Vol. 22
SOVEREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
of the state and must be used for scientific or educational purposes.2 52
Anyone who fails to comply with the permit scheme or intentionally
"defaces, injures, destroys, displaces, or removes an object" of historical
value is guilty of a misdemeanor.25 3 However, the Georgia statute rec-
ognizes that this statute does not apply to private land, and thus only
"urges" that private landowners comply as the permit require. 254 Ac-
cordingly, states may adequately protect their interests in artifacts
while still recognizing traditional American property expectations.
255
V. CONCLUSION
The right to property protection is a right that many Americans
view as a symbol that acts as a barrier between individual rights and
legitimate government power. 256 However, even in light of the histori-
cal diminution of property rights, the present constitutional doctrine
recognizes that individuals should be compensated when the state
completely deprives an individual of their rightly acquired property.
25 7
Eric from the hypothetical who found a Civil War-era watch should be
able to exhibit it to his friends and tell them where he found it without
fearing that Alabama may decide that the watch Eric found on his land
actually belongs to the state. At the very least, if the people of the State
of Alabama feel compelled to take Eric's property in the name of
archaeological preservation, they should be prepared to pay for it.
Charles P. Walsh, Jr.
252. Id.; see also ARK CODE ANN. §13-6-301 (Michie 2001)(Reserving ownership to
artifacts found on state lands but only encouraging individuals on private land to con-
sult with the state archaeologist).
253. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-54.
254. GA. CODE ANN. §13-3-52(c);
255. See supra Part 1(A).
256. See NEDELSKY, supra note 90, at 246-50; see also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY
RIGHTS, FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE 14"' AMENDMENT.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 88-137.
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